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ABSTRACT
The history of the Civil Rights Movement is often about resistance (both non
violent and violent) to racist environments. In Roanoke, Virginia, it took nearly
twenty years to integrate city schools, yet opposition by the African American
community has been nearly forgotten. School closings in Prince Edward County
became the enduring image of civil rights in Virginia, while historians have
generally ignored the patterns of desegregation in Roanoke and other areas in
western Virginia because they assumed integration there to be a smooth
transition. The case study of Roanoke provides a very different response to civil
rights in Virginia that was directed by the city’s white and black elites. While
change elsewhere was volatile, change in Roanoke occurred at a much slower
pace, a pace comfortable for these leaders. Roanoke’s history does not mirror
the traditional model of civil rights action spearheaded by youth and challenges
traditional views of Virginia’s postwar twentieth century political history. At the
same time, Roanoke’s integration shows that even where whites and blacks
generally frowned upon racial violence, children could still receive psychological
scars.
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Introduction
The School Board of Roanoke City welcomed Dr. Harry T. Penn, a dentist
and “Negro political leader,” to its monthly meeting on July 14, 1948.1 Roanoke’s
morning newspaper announced the public school system would now be
desegregated on page four, under a misleading title. Dr. Penn’s rise to the
formerly all-white school board came two years before the University of Virginia
desegregated its law school, said to be the first public institution desegregated in
Virginia.2 Yet the act earned little public comment from Roanoke’s white
observers. Penn’s promise “to render service, not to any one class, but to all”
received less newspaper ink than new cafeteria equipment for a Junior High
School. This would not be the last news on Roanoke’s desegregation to be
hidden from the public, nor would it signify the approach of integrated public
schools. These did not come until over a quarter century of struggle.
The history of the Civil Rights Movement is often about resistance (both
non-violent and violent) to racist environments. In Roanoke, Virginia, passive
resistance to all forms of desegregation delayed meaningful integration longer
than massive resistance. “Civil” politics and a lack of open conflict ensured that
change came at a pace comfortable to white leaders. As school closings in
Prince Edward County became the enduring image of civil rights in Virginia,
historians generally ignored the patterns of desegregation in Roanoke and other

1 Roanoke City School Board Minutes, July 14, 1948, 1. Roanoke Times, “School Board
Renames Smith, Two New Members Seated at Organization Meet,” July 15, 1948, 4.
2 Peter Wallenstein, Cradle o f America: Four Centuries o f Virginia History (Lawrence, University
Press of Kansas, 2007), 336-342.
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areas of western Virginia because they assumed integration there to be a smooth
transition.3 The case study of Roanoke provides a very different response to civil
rights in Virginia that was directed by the city’s white and black elites. While
change elsewhere was volatile, change in Roanoke occurred at a much slower
pace, a pace acceptable to these leaders. Roanoke’s history does not mirror the
traditional model of civil rights action spearheaded by youth and challenges
traditional views of Virginia’s postwar twentieth century political history. At the
same time, Roanoke’s integration shows that even where whites and blacks
generally frowned upon racial violence, children could still receive scars, both
physical and psychological.
Yet the damage done was more subtle than that thrust upon communities
in eastern Virginia. After all, the State’s massive resisters closed school systems,
amended the state constitution, and even razed entire neighborhoods to avoid
desegregating schools.4 As a candidate for Governor, Lindsay J. Almond
famously stated that he “would rather lose [his] right arm than see the first nigra
child admitted to the white schools of Virginia” during a campaign speech in
Roanoke’s all-white Jefferson High School.5 Despite Almond’s fiery rhetoric,
Roanoke always considered itself more progressive towards African Americans
3 Heinemann, Ronald, John G. Kolp, Anthony S. Parent Jr, W illiam G. Spade. Old Dominion, New
Commonwealth: A H istory o f Virginia, 1607-2007 (Charlottesville: University of Virginia, 2007),
348.
4 Forest White, Pride o r Prejudice: School Reform and Urban R enewal in Norfolk, 1950-1959
(Westport, CT: Praeger Press, 1992). W hite persuasively argues that Norfolk’s Mayor
Duckworth used urban renewal as a blunt tool to raze neighborhoods that had threatened
desegregation.
5 Linwood Holton, O pportunity Time (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2008), 51.
Years afterward Roanoke’s African Americans would jokingly refer to him as “one-armed
Lindsay.”
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than the rest of Virginia. Former NAACP President Alphonso Holland, concluded
the city deserved “an A minus for all they have done.” From A. L. Holland’s
perspective, Roanoke managed civil rights laws in a fairer way than many of
Virginia’s communities. Over Holland’s lifetime he saw segregation’s
dehumanizing effect on African Americans and so any progress was positive. Yet,
his assessment did not console African American students who attended
overcrowded, outdated schools while the board quietly resisted desegregation
plans. The desegregation process in their public schools started in 1948 but was
not effectively over until 1974.6 Why did a city that prided itself on “good” racial
relations take almost two decades to achieve effective desegregation? City
officials only moved as far as federal courts forced them, while they actively
claimed to desegregate more quickly.
Part of the explanation can be found in Roanoke’s social geography. It
was a very segregated city with most of the African American population living
immediately north of downtown while whites lived in the south and along citycounty borders. Roanoke also had a much lower proportion of African Americans
than the rest of Virginia. The academic consensus on Virginia’s twentieth century
history considers desegregation almost a non-factor in the western portion of the
state because so few African Americans resided there.7 Although in the late

6 The end date refers to an appeals case won by the City in which the decision certified that the
schools had a balanced racial ratio. Due to increased housing segregation, recent Supreme
Court decisions, and a revitalized neighborhood schools movement, Roanoke City Schools, like
those around the country have re-segregated in the past two decades.
7 James Ely, The Crisis o f Conservative Virginia: The Byrd Organization and the Politics of
Massive Resistance (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1976), 110. See Appendix B for
a map on African American population distribution in Virginia at this time.
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nineteenth century the black community made up a third of Roanoke’s total
population, by 1950, the population of Roanoke was 91,921 with 14,575 African
Americans comprising less than twenty percent.8 In 1961, journalist Benjamin
Muse, asserted that “race prejudice is at a minimum” in northern and western
Virginia where “negroes are few.”9 The city leadership echoed this sentiment.
Throughout the school debates, individuals, black and white, spoke of the great
relations enjoyed in the city compared to other places in the South.10 Many in the
city worked hard to maintain a moderate, civilized image, but not all held this
perspective. The school board chairman once advised a black member of the
school board to “just keep in mind [that] all the Mississippi thinking people are not
in Mississippi.”11
By revealing the stories of many who lived through desegregation, I hope
to challenge historians who describe desegregation in Virginia as a process that
lasted less than a decade, began with the Brown Decision, underwent Massive
Resistance, achieved legal and legislative recourse, and saved public schools. In
Roanoke, massive resistance never became an official policy. With Roanoke’s
school desegregation and the movement for civil rights, a pattern of leadership
emerged in which members of the African American middle class agreed to
8 US Census Data, 1950, Roanoke City, VA. This is about 15% of the population, a fairly high
number for western Virginia (nearby W ythe County had only 4.6% in 1950). In Surry County,
located in Southside Virginia, 63.7% of the population was African Am erican in 1950.
9 Benjamin Muse, Virginia’s Massive Resistance (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1961),
6.
10 Roanoke City School Board Minutes, April 13, 1964, 7. Dr. Paxton, a black school board
member, says “This is a fine city with splendid race relations” but he does not “want to see
Roanoke have the same difficulties other communities have had.”
11 “W arren,” Interview with Author, June 15, 2005, Roanoke, V A pg 8.
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minimize open conflict in return for a voice in some city decisions. Indeed,
prominent African American leaders did have constant representation in local
government. After Dr. Penn’s original victory, the school board had numerous
important African American representatives including the Reverend A.L. James
who replaced Dr. Penn in 1951. Dr. Wendell Butler rose to chairman of the city
school board from 1975 to 1980. The City elected Reverend Noel C. Taylor to
City Council in 1970 and then Mayor from 1975 to 1992. Yet, for twenty five years
Roanoke had African American representation on a school board that did not
move towards desegregation unless forced to do so by judicial mandate. This
thesis examines how and why this happened, and what Roanoke’s story
contributes to our understanding of both Virginia’s history as well as that of the
civil rights movement.
Though important, newspaper articles, court briefs, school board minutes,
and desegregation plans leave critical gaps in the history of school
desegregation in Roanoke. City leaders primarily created these documents and
left their own perspective on the record. The participants themselves tell a more
complex narrative.12 Many meetings took place behind closed doors or in

12 Several interviews were conducted between 2004-2007. The interviewees range from some of
the first integrated students, teachers, school administrators, politicians, parents of students,
school board members, and many others white and black, male and female. They are part of a
larger project on school desegregation in western Virginia conducted by Ted DeLaney and
other professors at W ashington and Lee University. As the project is ongoing and many of the
participants have not yet had a chance to edit and return transcripts of the interviews, they
remain anonymous but are identified with pseudonyms (“ Fred,” “ Ella”) and by their relationship
to the project (a black student, a white teacher, etc.). Their words often do a much better job
than mine of explaining the emotions and atmosphere involved. The Harrison Museum of
African Am erican Culture conducted several oral histories in the early 1990s with African
American comm unity leaders about the communities history in the twentieth-century, with topics
ranging from the local All-black life saving crew to urban renewal, and especially civil rights.
Tapes of several interviews conducted by Lillian Potter have also been used. These feature
important m embers of the white and black communities, including several white ministers
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executive session. This study of desegregation in Roanoke will not use oral
histories to supply facts that provide alternative explanations; instead, as
Elizabeth Tonkin argues, these oral histories make us “uncomfortably aware of
the elusive quality of historical truth itself.”13 These oral sources will challenge
Roanoke’s popular historical myth of “good race relations” and how it compares
to other “moderate” Southern cities.
Roanoke was one of several “moderate” southern cities. Many scholars
have examined such cities as case studies illuminating larger aspects of the civil
rights movement. These included William Chafe’s history of Greensboro, North
Carolina and Davison Douglas’ work on Charlotte. Like Roanoke, leaders in
these cities made a conscious decision that token desegregation provided
economic benefits. Moderate cities had their own “civil” politics which proved
problematic to African American leaders who had to follow these political
limitations, while still engaging in meaningful change. In Greensboro, Chafe
points to activist students who led direct protests to racial injustice and “civil”
politics.14 Douglas saw similar popular movements at work in Charlotte during the
early 1960s era of desegregation, but by 1970 it was legal activism that brought

involved in integration. Finally, the author conducted a round of interviews with additional
students, teachers, and com m unity members. William and Mary’s Institutional Review Board
approved the interview protocol, but per IRB requirements some of these interviews were
destroyed and are unavailable for future researchers.
13Alessandro Portelli, The Death o f Luigi Trastulli and Other Stories: Form and Meaning in Oral
History (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), viii-ix.
14 W illiam H. Chafe, Civilities and Civil Rights: Greensboro, North Carolina, and the Black
Struggle fo r Freedom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 1-12.
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about the most change.15 In Roanoke, no African American college drew student
activists to protest with the volume of those in Greensboro. Likewise, Roanoke
followed a similar legal path to Charlotte, but its busing system looked radically
different from Charlotte’s. These major differences helped shape Roanoke and
ultimately delayed meaningful integration.

Roanoke’s Early Racial History
Major racial conflicts rocked Roanoke at the height of its nineteenth
century economic boom and these played an important role in developing its
“civilized” reaction to threats of racial violence. One resident mentioned how the
early history affected such thinking: “that lynching, was such ancient history that
was buried and left. Because it would bring to rise something that the [city]
leadership thought ‘well we don’t want this anymore because it will never happen
again.’”16 The early history of Roanoke’s African American community provided
an important context to its politics of respectability.
Hilly and remote, western Virginia generally did not support tobacco
farming as easily as the Tidewater region. The culture of tobacco and a
plantation slave labor system did not spread to the former as it did in the latter.
As a result, western Virginia generally had a much smaller African American
population.17 When the Supreme Court first announced the Brown decision, the

15 Davison M. Douglas, Reading, Writing, and Race: The Desegregation o f the Charlotte Schools
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 1-5.
16 “Fred,” W hite male teacher, Interview with Author, June 14, 2005, Roanoke, VA, 16.
17 See Appendix A
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Roanoke Times reinforced the fact that the ruling did not apply to Buchanan
County in Southwestern Virginia, as no African Americans resided there.18
Roanoke was a city forged by the railroads and this had important
consequences for its geographic and economic development.19 The Virginia and
Tennessee Railroad which became the Norfolk and Western, then the Norfolk
Southern, crossed through a swamp named Big Lick. At this intersection of two
lines, a city named after the nearby Roanoke River was born.20 With the railroad
came increased migration, commerce, and industry. As a “Magic City” in the New
South, Roanoke grew by “around 2,000 percent from 1882-1890.”21 This
tremendous growth brought businessmen from the North who hoped to make
money on Roanoke’s boomtown status. The presence of so many northerners,
compared to so few native Virginians made Roanoke rather unique among
Virginia cities and indeed, cities throughout the South.
Despite its unique population, Roanoke was not immune to the post
reconstruction racial conflict that plagued other southern cities. Several cases of

18 “ Ban Does Not Affect Schools in Buchanan” Roanoke Times, May 19, 1954.
19 Raymond P. Barnes, A History o f the City o f Roanoke, (Radford, Virginia; Commonwealth
Press, 1968), 48-49. Barnes’ work is a business oriented chronology. As a source for dates,
place names, and early history his book is more successful than as a scholarly history. It ends
in 1940 and has little perspective on desegregation issues.
20 Roanoke was originally named Big Lick because the swampy area actually contained a
significant salinity. Local wildlife flocked to the area, because it provided them salt which they
could not ingest in other ways. This “salt lick” became “Big Lick.” W hen the N&W railroad
decided to make Big Lick a major terminus, it changed its name to the better sounding
Roanoke, after the nearby Roanoke River.
21 Rand Dotson, Roanoke, Virginia, 1882-1912: Magic City o f the New South (Knoxville:
University of Tennessee Press, 2007), 239. There are several “Magic Cities” in the south, all
named because of their “ magic” growth, the most famous is Birmingham, Alabama which had
the second highest percentage of growth behind Roanoke.

lynching within the city attest to this. The first notable case came in 1892 with the
lynching of William Lavender by a group of masked men.22 No one was convicted
of any crimes related to the lynching, and city chroniclers considered it a
“civilized” lynching conducted by “respectable citizens.”23 Another lynching
occurred a year later. This time, a mob of poor whites lynched Thomas Smith.
Unlike the previous vigilante violence sanctioned by city leaders, the mayor
attempted to protect the accused and called in the city militia. Eight citizens died
in the ensuing riot. Roanoke's violence spurred a state-wide response to limit
such lawless behavior.24 The Magic City of the South, as Roanoke’s boosters
referred to the city, was far from perfect.25 Statewide disgust toward the
“Roanoke Riot of 1893” led to new legislation that discouraged lynchings and the
mob rule that caused them. Roanoke worked hard to polish its image, but for the
city’s African American residents accused of capital crimes, officially sanctioned
“justice” replaced that of vigilantes.26 Roanoke’s 19th century leadership looked at
the separate incidents based on how they were conducted, not based on the

22 Barnes, History o f Roanoke, 245.
23 Dotson, Magic City o f the N ew South, 127-129.
24 Dotson, Magic City o f the N ew South, 160. Dotson, Magic City o f the New South, 129, 149-150.
Dotson includes lyrics to the “ Roanoke Riot” or “Roanoke Outrage.” The riot occurred during a
serious econom ic depression in Roanoke. With the N&W railroad under reorganization, several
factories closed or layed off workers and four of the City’s seven banks failed. One bank even
repossessed an Episcopal Church and sold it at auction to meet delinquent mortagage
payments (Dotson, 129).
25 Roanoke is often referred to as the “Star City of the South” because of the very large
illuminated star that sits atop Mill Mountain and can be seen throughout the city. In the 19th
century, boosters called Roanoke the “Magic City” because it grew so rapidly, as if by magic.
26 Dotson, Magic City o f the N ew South, 123-124. Dotson points out that the result for African
Americans was essentially the same before and after the riot: Jim Crow racism
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eventual results- extralegal and brutal lynching. When the struggle over school
desegregation came to Roanoke, the city leaders also focused on how the
process would appear to the outside world, and minimized conflict. As with 19th
century lynching or passive resistance to school desegregation in the twentieth, it
was the African American community that suffered.
In Roanoke, as in the rest of Virginia, the needs of the black community
were subordinate to the needs of the white community. The city’s residential
segregation reiterated this political hierarchy, which was not only by custom, but
by law. Besides white northerners, the railroad brought many African Americans
hoping to work the unskilled labor positions required by the railroad. Even in the
nineteenth century, the African American community, according to historian Rand
Dotson, “lived in clusters along the same streets, the vast majority worked similar
unskilled or day labor jobs, and most patronized the same all-black saloons and
dance halls.”27 While each section had general political autonomy, the all-white
city hall made the rules. In 1913, this included an ordinance banning the sale of
previously white owned homes to African Americans and African Americans who
bought such homes would be at fault. In 1917, the Supreme Court struck down
residential segregation ordinances in the Buchanan v. Warley case, but many
communities in Virginia ignored the decision, including Roanoke.28 Though the
NAACP Ledgal Defense Fund was successful in bringing suit against residential
27 Dotson, Magic City o f the N ew South, 122.
28 Naomi A. Mattos, “Segregation by Custom vs. Segregation by Law: Residential Segregation
Ordinances and Their Effects on the City of Roanoke, 1910-1917,” (Paper Prepared for the
Roanoke Regional Preservation Office, 2005), 23-27. Roanoke had codified its residential
segregation in 1913. Despite the Supreme Court ruling, the code stayed on the city’s books for
years afterward.
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segregation ordinances, communities continued to flaunt the prevailing case
law.29 In 1921, city officials called a meeting with leaders of the black community.
City leaders intended to discuss a resolution verifying residential segregation of
the city after some encroachment by blacks into all-white neighborhoods. African
American leaders hoped to address the terrible conditions in their
neighborhoods. Most areas lacked paved streets, sewers, gas, or electricity and
reports indicated poor conditions at schools. The meeting ended when the two
sides realized they had irreconcilable agendas.30 The rigid residential
segregation continued as evidenced by Roanoke Times advertisements like
“Modern Homes for Colored People” in the 1920s.31
This de facto segregation continued into the post-war period. By then, the
city could be divided into four quadrants: Northwest, Northeast, Southwest, and
Southeast. Each of these quadrants had a specific racial and class character with
most of the poorest blacks resided in the Northeast in close proximity to the
railroad yards, the riverside industry, and the brick factory. Middle-class African
Americans lived in the Northwest. White areas of town were as segregated by
class. More affluent whites lived in the Southwest part of town; the Southeast
remained distinctly blue collar and white. There was little movement of people
between quadrants and none between white and black areas of town. When

29 Mark V. Tushnet, Making Civil Rights Law: Thurgood M arshall and the Supreme Court, 1956-61
(New York; Oxford University Press, 1994), 84-84.
30 J. Douglas Smith, Managing White Supremacy: Race, Politics, and Citizenship in Jim Crow
Virginia, (Chapel Hill; University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 71.
31 Advertisement, Roanoke Times, April 11, 1922 as quoted in Mattos, “Segregation by Custom,”
Exhibit 3. The housing for sale was located in the Gainesboro neighborhood, then in transition
from white to black. Offers would only be made to “high class colored people.”
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residential segregation was threatened, whites responded harshly. After Leonard
Williams, an African American manager at an ABC store moved across the 10th
St. racial dividing line in 1959, white teenagers threatened him and later tossed
eggs, rocks, and firecrackers through his windows. Responding to one occasion,
he “reached down and grabbed [his] 38 [caliber revolver] and put it up...[he said]
‘here’s what you all want, right here... move.’” On another occasion, as his wife
“sat on the front porch there and ... had [white neighbors] pass by many times.
‘Get out niggers!’ hollering and screaming loud as they [could].”32 According to
another black resident,, South Roanoke was “kind of an area which was taboo to
black people.”33 This extreme segregation made it easy to keep the black and
white communities insulated from one another and friction between them to a
minimum. While this limited violence, it would cause significant trouble to
complete integration of Roanoke schools. The physical distance added to
Roanoke’s “moderate” response, but also became one more factor to delay
implementation of the Supreme Court’s most famous decision.

Brown Comes to Virginia
On May 17, 1954, the school board of Roanoke gathered to meet at the
administration building around 8:00 PM. That morning, Chief Justice Earl Warren
announced perhaps the most important and far reaching court decision of the
twentieth century. On such a momentous day, Roanoke City’s school board met
32 Leonard A. W illiams, Interview with Michael Cooke, June 16, 1992, Oral History Collection,
Harrison Museum of African American Culture, Roanoke, Virginia, 20-25. Ibid. 26.
33 “ Ella,” Black Mother, Interview with Morgan Hill, June 15, 2005, 3.
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but issued no momentous decisions. Instead, Leroy H. Smith tendered his
resignation because “the textile markets [had] been in rather unstable condition.”
Likewise, Rev. A.L. James terminated his service to the board due to health
problems.34 These excuses were plausible. Smith had served on the board for
over 15 years and James died only three years after resigning. Yet, no one
mentioned the elephant in the room: the Brown Decision.
It is difficult to forecast whether desegregation may have come to
Roanoke City more quickly had the board’s most respected members remained
for its implementation.35 Considering Virginia’s state-wide massive resistance
legislation, Roanoke might have been forced to wait the six years it took for even
token desegregation to occur. But the decision by James and Smith to avoid
what they knew would be a long, difficult, and unpopular path continued a pattern
of racial relations. Roanoke would choose foot dragging over confronting what
the Roanoke Times called the South’s “most critical problem since
reconstruction.”36
It is impossible to tell the story of desegregation in Roanoke without
putting it in the context of the state-wide and national desegregation narrative.
The Brown Decision was actually five separate cases including plaintiffs from
Topeka, Kansas; Clarendon County, South Carolina; Hockessin, Delaware;
Washington, DC; and Prince Edward County, Virginia. Of these, the story of

34 Roanoke City School Board Minutes, May 17, 1954, pg 5-6.
35At times, “ Roanoke” will be referred to in this paper. This always refers to Roanoke City. The full
name will be used w henever Roanoke County is the subject.
36“ Editorial: Coeducation and Integrated Schools,” Roanoke Times, July 12, 1954.
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Prince Edward County, where African Americans were nearly half the county’s
population, is most relevant as it became the symbol of Virginia’s school
desegregation narrative.
In many ways, the Southside area was an unlikely place for the frontlines
of school desegregation in Virginia. The local NAACP leadership even tried to
discourage mass protest against segregated education initially due to the forces
arrayed against them.37 Prince Edward County was 44% African American, but
run by notoriously conservative white citizens. The case in Prince Edward County
revolved around Robert Moton High School in Farmville, Virginia. Moton was the
town’s black high school and badly neglected. To cope with its overcrowding, the
school board erected three low temporary buildings topped with black tar paper.
The “tar paper shacks,” as African Americans dubbed them, angered the
community as they had heavily contributed to a municipal bond offering in 1948,
partly to improve local education. The school board gave the NAACP chapter
president, the Reverend L. Francis Griffin, little redress. Finally a Moton PTA
committee devoted to lobbying for a new school was told that there was no point
in returning to the monthly school board meetings as no improvements were
forthcoming.38
It was at this point that the Prince Edward County story became
interesting. Ajunior at Robert Moton High School, Barbara Johns, decided to take
37 Michael J. Klarman, Brown v. Board o f Education and the Civil Rights M ovement (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2007), 55.
38 Patterson, Brown v. Board, 25. Bob Smith, They Closed Their Schools: Prince Edward County,
Virginia, 1951-1964, (Chapel Hill; University of North Carolina Press, 1965), 13, 18, 25. This
work is more of a journalistic view of the desegregation controversy in Prince Edward County,
but it does provide a very good account of the happenings prior to 1965.
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matters into her own hands. Johns was the niece of the Reverend Vernon Johns,
a pastor at Dexter Street Baptist Church in Montgomery, Alabama, and a figure in
the civil rights movement.39 In 1951, following further foot dragging by the School
Board of Prince Edward County, Johns secretly organized a strike by the
students of Moton High. Years before mass protests in Montgomery, most of the
students walked out of class and refused to return. They marched with
homemade placards displaying slogans like “We Want a New School or None At
All” and “Down with the Tar Paper Shacks.”40 In a notice about a mass meeting of
the PTA and NAACP about the case being filed, the black leaders reminded the
community that “the eyes of the world are on us.”41 The students stayed out of
school for two weeks. Initially, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund (LDF) was
hesitant to take the case. The students pressed for equalization of funding for
white and black schools; the “equal” of “separate, but equal.” The LDF committed
to a strategy of overturning segregation, rather than equalization of separate
facilities. Also, Prince Edward County would be one of the worst environments to
receive a favorable decision. Likewise, plaintiffs could expect far more retribution
and attack than in a more moderate Virginia community. Over these concerns,
the students and their parents chose to fight against segregation and, with the
help of NAACP LDF Lawyers, Spotswood Robinson and Oliver Hill, the students

39 Patterson, Brown V. Board, 28.
40 Smith, They Closed Their Schools, 40.
41 Smith, They Closed Their Schools, 58.
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sued the School Board of Prince George’s County. The case was eventually
added to the Brown v. Board cases 42
On May 17, 1954, Chief Justice Earl Warren announced that in the field of
public education, the doctrine of “separate but equal’ has no place.”43 In the days
and months following the first decision, the Roanoke Times issued several
editorials cautioning against radical change in the wake of the decision. A July 4th
editorial promoted finding middle ground “between social theories of the
Supreme Court and the obfuscations of those who would radically alter our
political system.”44 The Times fluctuated between advocating research on school
systems segregated by sex and moving slowly on both plans for desegregation
and plans advocating massive resistance. On Roanoke City’s school board, two
of its most prominent members resigned and Brown went unmentioned.
Though the court ruled segregation in public schools unconstitutional in
the first Brown decision, the justices waited to recommend any specific recourse
for school districts and asked for advice from each state as to the best course of
action. A year after the original verdict, the Supreme Court announced what
would be called “Brown II." This decision instructed the Federal District and
Appeals Courts to require defendants to begin a “prompt and reasonable start
toward full compliance” with Brown. The district courts would also be required to
“enter such orders and decrees consistent with this opinion as are necessary and

42Klarman, Brown v. Board o f Education, 55.
43 Brown v. Board o f Education o f Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
44 “ 1776- We, the people- 1954,” Roanoke Times, July 4,1954.
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proper to admit to public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all
deliberate speed the parties to these cases.”45
The Supreme Court appeared to mollify the South with a decision that
would give them plenty of time to create plans for desegregation. The ruling also
focused solely on the defendants and did not require immediate universal
desegregation of other schools. The members of each school district would have
to fight their way through the courts before schools would be desegregated.
Finally, the phrase “all deliberate speed” came to mean “all deliberate delay” to
most school districts, including Roanoke’s.
In order to generate a plan to resist the Supreme Court ruling, the state’s
governor, Thomas Stanley, created a commission of legislators led by Senator
Garland Gray. Stanley immediately announced that there would be no integration
for the school year 1954-55 in order to study the problem. Senator Byrd began
drafting what would become the Southern Manifesto in 1956, a statement signed
by the eighty-two Representatives and nineteen Senators and entered into
congressional record alleging the Brown decision to be an illegal intrusion on
State’s Rights. They promised to keep their home districts segregated. Massive
Resistance had begun.46

45 Brown V. Board o f Education o f Topeka, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) from Patterson, Brown V. Board,
84.
46 For more on Massive Resistance see Ely, Crisis o f Conservative Virginia; Gates, The Making o f
Massive R esistance; Jam es Howard Hershman, Jr. There’s a Rumbling in the Museum: The
Opponents o f Virginia’s Massive Resistance (University of Virginia: Unpublished PhD
dissertation, 1978); Brian Daugherity ‘“ Keep on Keeping On’: African Am ericans and the
Implementation of Brown v. Board of Education in Virginia” in With A ll Deliberate Speed:
Implem enting Brown v. Board o f Education (Little Rock: University of Arkansas Press, 2008).
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Massive Resistance refers specifically to a political movement that sought
to avoid federally mandated desegregation by creating state laws to penalize any
district planning to desegregate, whether voluntarily or by court order. It lasted
from 1955 to 1964 in some areas, like Prince Edward County. The movement
was most powerful from 1956 until 1958 when courts overturned most massive
resistance legislation. In Virginia, the mechanism for resisting was a law that
would go into effect once an African American student threatened to desegregate
a white school. The school board would immediately lose control of their system
and the Virginia Governor would determine its fate which was, in the case of
Prince Edward County, closure.
Along with closing schools, Senator Byrd called for amendments to
Virginia’s constitution allowing the state legislature to appropriate money to
private, segregated academies and repealing mandatory public education
clauses. Virginia’s massive resisters considered themselves part of a political
movement, but despite their contempt for federal rulings they did not openly
advocate racial violence as some leaders did in the Deep South.47 Passive
resistance, on the other hand, was not an organized political movement, but a
style of avoiding major integration by allowing token desegregation, discouraging
litigation, and staying quiet on the subject. Passive and Massive Resistance were
political strategies of perpetuating racial segregation but did not actively
encourage racial violence in any way.

47 Heinemann, Ronald, H arry Byrd o f Virginia (Charlottesville; University of Virginia Press, 1996),
353-354.
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Though not the official policy, many groups did encourage such violence.
In Richmond, a new organization formed to enforce segregation through personal
terror and coercion. The Defenders of State Sovereignty and Independent
Liberties formed on October 8th, 1954. Like other pro-white groups such as the
Klan, Anglo-Saxon Clubs, and White Citizens’ Councils, the Defenders of State
Sovereignty pressured School Boards in each county to resist integration. Even
Roanoke County might have gotten a visit from Supporters of this organization
who came to Roanoke when, according to a white teacher of Roanoke County
and City Schools:
Three white guys, kind of rough but presentable looking; they came
in and had a private conference with the Principal... They came
and said, ‘Mr. Johnson we are concerned with what is taking place
and what has taken place. We want you to know if you need any
help in regards to the welfare of the white students under these
circumstances, we are there to help.’48
The group was particularly active in Prince Edward County and helped galvanize
white opinion to support massive resistance. Moderates were left with little choice
between closing public schools rather than desegregate or joining white liberals
and black supporters of integration shunned by mainstream white society.
Indeed, the Reverend James R. Kennedy, the pastor of white Farmville
Presbyterian Church, felt that “as a Christian, [he couldn’t] defend segregation...
[because] you can’t take the gospel with its great message of His love for
everyone and defend enforced segregation.”49 Kennedy was run out of town for

48 “ Fred,” white male school teacher, June 14, 2005, 4. It is to be noted that this is secondhand
information to the interviewee, but there is no reason to question its authenticity.
49 Smith, They Closed Their Schools, 126.
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his support of keeping schools open despite the risk of desegregation. Though
he did not consider himself an integrationist, Kennedy received swift castigation.
Moderates had great trouble finding a middle ground in the debate throughout
eastern Virginia and the rest of the South. More than many political issues,
desegregation polarized communities. In Roanoke, society did not literally kick
moderates out of town, but public moderate views often brought social
marginalization. One white parent described the atmosphere:
The people that were opposed to it were more outspoken and when
we get together to play cards or have friends in for dinner and sit
around and have coffee and talk about things, that was usually the
situation. The folks that were opposed were pretty outspoken about
it and vehement about it.50
Publicly, white Roanokers hesitated to discuss desegregation, but privately, the
topic occupied many conversations.
In the midst of local debates on integration, the Gray Commission, a blue
ribbon group tasked with determining a state-wide policy that would meet federal
law, reported its findings. It recommended a state policy of having no white
children attend an integrated school against the will of their parents. Integration
of schools would be determined by community choice. Local schools could also
be closed by community choice rather than desegregate. Parents who did not
wish their child to attend an integrated school would be given tuition grants to
private segregated schools.51 The idea of tuition grants would be a part of many
desegregation plans in the years to come as an “escape clause.” In localities

50“Greg,” June 22, 2005, white parent and local politician, 4.
51 Smith, They Closed Their Schools, 141.
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around the state, private schools sprang up to meet the new demand for
segregated schooling. Even citizens in Roanoke created new segregated private
schools. In nearby Bedford County, the Bedford Academy was created on the
eve of desegregation and roughly half of the county’s white school children
attended it.52
The maneuverings between Governor Stanley and the Gray Commission
occurred in a highly politicized atmosphere and under the close supervision of
Senator Harry F. Byrd, Virginia’s political leader since the end of the Second
World War. Byrd’s political machine had almost complete control over key
statewide positions, but in western Virginia his power was much weaker.
Because western Virginia had strong pockets of GOP support, it avoided the
major fight between the Byrd machine and more independent Democrats like
Harry Howell. Linwood Holton, one of western Virginia’s most successful
politicians, articulated the disconnect between the eastern and western
establishments: “It was then the perception of most southwestern Virginians...
that the attitude of the Richmond establishment is that you’ve reached the end of
the state when you get to Roanoke.”53 The distance from the Byrd machine also
meant Roanoke politicians had more autonomy than politicians in eastern cities
like Richmond or Norfolk.

52 “Fred,” 4 and “Jane,” a white female student integrated in Bedford County Schools in 1965, 4.
53 Holton, O pportunity Time, 7-8. A supporter had introduced Holton as “the Governor that knows
Virginia doesn’t stop at Roanoke.” She said later, “Lin, Virginia does end at Roanoke, if you’re
going east!”
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Despite the freedom to take a course independent from the Byrd machine,
the Roanoke School Board sided with the Gray Commission and passed a
resolution voicing its support of an amendment to Section 141 of the Virginia
Constitution, which mandated that private schools not be funded with public
money. The school board resolution did not pass unanimously. A white member
and Dr. Lylburn Downing, the board’s lone African American member dissented.
Following Roanoke’s code of civilized discussion, Dr. Downing observed that
“even though he could not conscientiously vote otherwise, he certainly
recognized the action of the board as an excellent example of the democratic
way of transacting business.”54 The constitutional amendment was part of a
referendum on segregation put in front of the voters only two weeks later.
Segregationists billed it as a referendum for or against integration. The
amendment passed in Roanoke by a small margin. Despite a reputation for
moderation, Roanoke missed a curcial opportunity to support their public
schools, delaying desegregation for years.
In 1956, Judge Sterling Hutchinson refused to obey the Supreme Court
order requiring Prince Edward County to desegregate. He felt that his superiors
in the Federal Court System understood neither the situation in the county nor
the racial relations of Black Belt Virginia.55 Under Virginia’s massive resistance
law, the governor closed these schools to stop their desegregation by federal
court order. As moderates won seats in the 1958 state elections and the courts
54 Roanoke City School Board Minutes, December, 19, 1955, 4-5.
55 J.W. Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men: Southern Federal Judges and School Desegregation
(New York: Harcourt Brace and World, 1961), 213.
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ruled many of the laws and school closings unconstitutional, the local efforts at
massive resistance waned. . . State and local politicians formulated a new plan of
“passive resistance.” The ideas of “all deliberate delay” and token desegregation
were the new tactics used by school boards around Virginia, including
Roanoke’s.

Roanoke’s School System in the Era of Massive Resistance
Though the School Board preferred to focus on anything but
desegregation, the Roanoke NAACP did not allow this complacency. In 1956,
following the city-wide vote on funding private schools, the organization made a
deliberate change to its previous strategy by electing African American attorney
Reuben Lawson, “a militant President.” Lawson gave a powerful acceptance
speech, arguing that “Our forebears were slaves and so are we, because we can
never be free until every man is free... I shall contact the State Legal Head of
NAACP and ask his help and advice as to procedures for bringing desegregation
to Roanoke.”56 The result was a letter sent seven months later from Lawson to
the school board inquiring into school desegregation plans for the fall of 1956.
The Board “noted that the communication had been received from Mr. Lawson as
an individual and not as a representative of any group” despite his official
position as NAACP President. Dr. Lylburn Downing, the board’s only African
American member, “observed that ‘it had to come up, sooner or later” but that he

56 “Roanoke Branch Elects Militant President At Crowded Meeting”, Roanoke Tribune, January 28,
1956.
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“saw no reason for a hurried reply.”57 Well over a month later came the board’s
unanimous response: “the Board does not contemplate at the present time, any
change in the operation of the public schools in Roanoke.”58 In response to
Lawson’s action, the Roanoke Times threatened that the [white] South might
enact economic retribution against African Americans for pushing school
integration. Referring to African Americans: “he knows that to force himself into a
situation where he is not acceptable may prove more costly than profitable.”59
This economic threat was clear. It had taken over eight months for Roanoke’s
leaders, white and black, to decide that no action would occur in 1956. During
this same time period, African Americans in Montgomery, Alabama waged one of
the most successful mass protests of the civil rights movement. Compared to the
Montgomery bus boycott, Roanoke’s relative silence was deafening.
Despite its sluggish pace, Roanoke’s African American community
continued to push for improvements in education. Though newer black schools
like Lucy Addison High School had excellent facilities, many were well below
standards of white schools. In 1957, the Gainsboro Elementary PTA noted that
the school still had no indoor plumbing, no cafeteria, auditorium, and was heated
by wood stoves.60 That same year, students forced out of Northeast
neighborhoods by the Commonwealth urban renewal project had overcrowded
Gilmer and Loudon Elementary Schools. Their parents protested that if the
57 Roanoke City School Board Minutes, July 16, 1956, 3-5.
58 Roanoke City School Board Minutes, August 20, 1956, 17-18.
59 “Editorial: The Latest Move By the NAACP”, Roanoke Times, July 17, 1956.
60 Roanoke City School Board Minutes, February 11, 1957, 1-3.
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situation was not corrected, students would be forced to apply to West End
Elementary, a white school. The board voted to defer action on the matter.61
The overcrowding at Gilmer and Loudon Elementary Schools was
symptomatic of the entire Roanoke system. The School Board had responded to
a boom in population with few new buildings. Classrooms were partitioned.
Cafeterias, auditoriums, and storage closets were turned into classrooms. The
administration finally turned to using morning and afternoon sessions in most of
the schools. These would not be enough to check the post war baby boom. With
little money coming from the state for new school construction, Roanoke had to
turn to alternate sources for funds. In 1958, the city proposed a bond to raise
money for a very ambitious school building program. This project supported the
construction of two new high schools, new libraries, auditoriums, and over 80
new classrooms in the white and black areas of town.
The city-wide political campaign over the $8 million bond was heated. In
the end, the school bond issue passed with 54.9% of the vote, mostly with
support from the African American community and white neighborhoods closest

61 Roanoke City School Board Minutes, October, 21, 1957, 4-5. Milton Garrison, “Supreme Court’s
Action in Evidence At Roanoke School Board Meet,” Roanoke Times, October 22, 1957. This
was likely an action with strong political overtones. Virginia was in the midst of a gubernatorial
race between Republican Ted Dalton and Democrat Lindsay Almond. The two were scheduled
for a debate in Roanoke on October 2nd. Furthermore, some of Alm ond’s resistance legislation
had just been ruled unconstitutional by Federal Judge W alter Hoffman (who had been on
Dalton’s ticket for Attorney General in 1953) with the Supreme Court declining to grant it
certiorari. Almond was particularly embarrassed by the action because he had been Virginia’s
Attorney General and primarily created the legislation to resist judicial scrutiny. For more on
how Virginian and national politics intersected with school desegregation see Ely, Crisis of
Conservative Virginia; Gates, The Making o f Massive Resistance; Jam es Howard Hershman,
Jr. There’s a Rum bling in the Museum: The Opponents o f Virginia’s Massive Resistance
(University of Virginia: Unpublished PhD dissertation, 1978).
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to schools to be built or expanded by the bond.62 This was not an overwhelming
approval of public education by the City, but forced Roanoke onto a particular
path regarding school desegregation in the short term. As James Hershman has
explained, Virginia’s massive resistance legislation tightened the school bond
market. According to the legislation, a district’s schools would be forced to close
in the event of desegregation. This would cause an expensive private school
voucher system to be implemented, putting great strain on city and county
treasuries.63 Though Virginia’s constitution provided that the state would pay off
debt in cases of municipality default, northern bankers were not satisfied. Lorin
Thompson commented at the time that "any plan to liquidate the public school
system in favor of a private arrangement as the massive resisters
contemplated... would necessitate an immediate settlement with the
bondholders.”64
Roanoke’s business community and its leaders who played an important
role on the school board knew that efforts at desegregation could cause school
closings and unrest between those who strongly favored or opposed
desegregation. Unrest caused uncertainty about bond issues on the New York
market and would make it difficult to find investors for Roanoke’s debt. At this

62 “School Bond Issue Passes 6,412 to 5259” Roanoke Times, March 12, 1958. The political
alliance between wealthy, white Southwest Roanoke and Northwest was an unlikely one, but
both groups pushed hard for the bond’s passage. The PTAAIIiance, an African American school
group, had twelve members speak at a public hearing on the bond and gave a donation of 10%
of its treasury ($30) to the Citizens Committee for Schools, an organization promoting the bond.
63 James H. Hershman, Jr. “ Public School Bonds and Virginia’s Massive Resistance” Journal of
Negro Education, Vol. 52, no. 4. (Autumn, 1983), 402-403.
64 Hershman, “ Public School Bonds and Virginia’s Massive Resistance.” 408.

26

time, Little Rock was receiving national attention because of its fight against
school desegregation. City councilmen in Roanoke must have reflected on Little
Rock’s own fairly moderate, business minded city council as that city became
embroiled in conflict. Little Rock had been poised for a major economic boom
following the creation of the Little Rock Air Base and Little Rock Industrial District
in 1951. In fall 1957, the director of the Little Rock Chamber of Commerce,
Everett Tucker, despaired as the city lost industrial prospects that could not move
to a place with major racial conflict and no high schools.65 Contrasting this
situation, many media reports favorably compared Charlotte. In fact, it was one of
the only southern cities with racial conflict to actually see increases in new
business, a fact certainly noted by Roanoke’s business leaders.66
In January 1959 the Virginia Supreme Court and a Federal District Court
found the school closing laws illegal. With court decisions throwing out many
Massive Resistance laws and the Federal intervention at Little Rock, Virginia
changed its model of massive resistance. In response to the efforts by state
courts, the General Assembly repealed Virginia’s compulsory education
requirement and suggested to municipalities that they had no power to enforce
local compulsory education requirements. 67 The state government provided pupil

65 Elizabeth Jacoway, Turn Aw ay Thy Son: Little Rock, The Crisis that Shocked the Nation (New
York: Free Press, 2007), 310-311. A national company, like Proctor and Gamble could not be
seen as supporting a segregationist city. Additionally, their workers would have no public
schools at which their children could enroll.
66 Douglas, Reading, Writing, Race, 74-75.
67Heinemann, H arry Byrd o f Virginia, 347; Roanoke City School Board Minutes, February 23,
1959, 11-12.
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scholarship grants to allow students to attend (presumably segregated) private
schools or public schools in another school district.68
With the threat of state enforced school closing over, the Roanoke School
Board began to push back against the program of Massive Resistance. On
August 17, 1959, the School Board declined to renew membership in the Virginia
Education Association which had strongly supported segregationist positions.
Although this symbolic step might seem inconsequential, it sent a clear message
to the forces of Massive Resistance in the state capital. On September 8th, the
City Council passed an ordinance requiring compulsory school attendance in
reaction to a Virginia law designed to make school optional for white children too
poor for private segregated academies. The School Board did continue to
provide pupil scholarships to students who applied and met requirements for the
scholarships, though some students still could not afford private schooling even
with the grants.69 Whether the Board felt new freedom to act with their bond issue
passed (and a revenue source independent of Richmond) or because massive
resistance seemed to be floundering in Virginia and elsewhere, by attacking
Richmond’s last attempts at Massive Resistance, Roanoke stated its preference
for “passive resistance.” The small challenges did not add up to a major revision
in thinking, but a gradual recognition that change would eventually come. The
City’s leadership embraced the technique of all deliberate delay by slowing any

68 Regulations of the State Board of Education Governing Pupil Scholarships, Adopted June 25,
1959. In addition, these regulations provided that scholarships could only be approved for non
sectarian schools within the United States.
69 Roanoke City School Board Minutes, August 17, 1959, 11. Roanoke City School Board
Minutes, Septem ber 21, 1959, 2-3.
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integration. The technique worked for many years despite protest from
Roanoke’s African American community.

Roanoke’s Racial Pioneers
This protest came in the form of a letter to the School Board from NAACP
Lawyer, Reuben Lawson, who informed the board that 34 students sought
transfer to “NON-SEGREGATED schools nearest to their homes.”70 The Board
did not deal with the petition, but let the state board assign the children. The
State Pupil Placement Board determined that nine of the children could not be
denied admission to white schools except due to race. These nine were
scheduled to begin September at three white schools in Roanoke. Twenty-eight
of the rejected students and an additional seven filed a federal desegregation suit
in August of 1960. The case became known as Cynthia Greene et al. v. School
Board of Roanoke City. The case worked its way through the court system with
one additional student being admitted to a white school. As the opinion in the
1962 court of appeals case in Cynthia Green, et. al. v. School Board of Roanoke
stated, “In practice, the state Pupil Placement Board's role in the assignment of
pupils is largely a formality.” Judge Sobeloff went on to state that “the pupil
assignment system in effect in the City of Roanoke ... is, as demonstrated by the
facts, infected throughout with racially discriminatory applications of assignment
criteria.” African American students needed to live closer to a white school than a
black school, score significantly higher on standardized tests than white students,
70 Roanoke City School Board Minutes, June 20, 1960, 8-12. Emphasis in original document. It is
also important to note the written “protest”, in keeping with Roanoke’s “politics of civility.”
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and voluntarily apply for such a transfer. The Pupil Placement Board mistakenly
rejected one student who lived closer to a white school and five students whose
younger siblings scored too low on standardized tests. According to the School
Board, African American students needed to be smarter than their white
classmates to “to avoid placing any Negroes in white schools ‘who would be
failures.’”71 The students chosen to meet the nearly impossible requirements
were all the best and brightest of the African American community, yet most did
not graduate.72
Of the students who were denied transfer, many were only told a few days
before classes began so they did not have enough time to appeal the decision.
The City’s resistance in court demonstrated their reluctance to allow any
desegregation, a narrative that would be remembered differently by leaders and
the public years later. While the School Board and NAACP fought in court over
the students whose transfer requests had been rejected, the accepted students
prepared for new schools.
On September 6th, 1960, the first black school children desegregated
several elementary schools without incident. On September 7th, however, Cecilia
Long and Eula Poindexter confronted a white crowd in front of Monroe Junior
High. As Cecilia Long, “drove up to the school...there were these [white] people”
that were “lined up on the sidewalks and looking really angry.” In addition to

71 Sobeloff, Chief Judge, and Boreman and J. Spencer Bell, Circuit Judges, Decision in Cynthia
Green, et al. vs. School Board o f the City o f Roanoke, May 22, 1962, Records for the U.S.
Court of Appeals 4th Circuit, Richmond, Virginia, Correspondence Relating to Cases 18911977, Box 702.
72 As this paper will elaborate, though they were very intelligent and members of the top Roanoke
families, many did not graduate from Roanoke City schools.
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throwing eggs and tomatoes at the car, they “yelled all sorts of things..., like ‘go
back to where you are supposed to be’, ‘coons get out of the neighborhood...’”
Cecilia endured the abuse while thinking “gosh, we’re just coming to school....”73
The incident was not reported in the Roanoke Times account of the first
day of integration. Although the paper had reporters present, they downplayed
white opposition to promote Roanoke’s moderate and racially conscious image.
National news outlets, including the New York Times echoed that “Negro and
White children attended classes together, without incidents” on the sixth, but
neglected to mention any resistance on the seventh.74 Roanoke’s leadership
knew that national media coverage would focus on the first day of desegregated
school. Yet threats of violence towards African American students on the second
day did not cause concern for city leaders, as long as it stayed out of local and
national media outlets.
Other African American students from the first “pioneering” or
desegregating generation had similar problems with desegregating the previously
all-white schools. With the prevalence of scattered integration, particularly in the
first years, white teachers and students often marginalized or treated African
Americans poorly. To be one of a few African American students moved to a
strange, white world proved very difficult. Leonard A. Williams’ children had
serious problems acclimating to the predominantly white school. He recalled that

73 Reverend Cecilia Long. Interview with Lillian Howard Potter, November 4, 1995, Hollins
College, Roanoke, Virginia, as quoted in Potter, “We W ent About It Peacefully”, 53.
74 “ Richmond Opens All W hite School to 2 Negro Girls”, New York Times, Septem ber 7, 1960, pg
1.
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“they were hurt by the way they were treated in grammar school” and “they come
home crying ‘bout what the kids said. They just didn’t want to be around the white
kids to go to high school” and would have quit school had they been forced to
attend the white high school. Williams eventually allowed them to transfer to
Addison.75
In 1969, the school board investigated the pioneering students’
experience. Of the seventeen African American students to desegregate schools
in 1960-61 (and who were no longer in Roanoke’s school system), only 9
graduated from Roanoke High Schools with three attending college. Of the
students who did not finish high school in Roanoke, two of the students
transferred out of the area and five dropped out.76 An almost 30% drop out rate
was extremely high attrition for children chosen as the best and brightest of the
community. These were children of Roanoke’s most prominent families. Future
mayor, Noel Taylor’s daughter integrated early and NAACP President, Reverend
Raymond Wilkinson’s daughters formed part of the first integrated cohort. Other
students applying for placement into previously white schools were the children
of ministers, doctors, and dentists. The problems encountered by these students
did not become part of the “popular memory” or community narrative on
desegregation despite their high standing in the community.
In July of 1962, Roanoke began moving beyond the initial desegregation
under pupil placement plans. U.S. District Judge Thomas Michie required the

75 Interview with Leonard W illiams, 29-30.
76 “Desegregation in the Roanoke City Schools”, Report attached to Roanoke City School Board
Minutes, March 25, 1969. One of the students who dropped out later received his/her GED.
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School Board to plan for the full desegregation of the schools in eight months.
The initial plan, created by the school superintendent E.W. Rushton, called for a
gradual desegregation of a few grades per year starting with the 1963-64 school
year and being completed by the 1967-68 school year. The plan also contained
an escape clause by which “any pupil assigned to a school in which his race is in
the minority may transfer to a school selected by the superintendent in which that
race is in the majority.”77 This plan had serious flaws. It did not allow for any
integration of faculty, the timeline of desegregation was too long, and the “escape
clause” would not stand up in court after recent rulings.78 By 1964, the School
Board put forth a modified plan that solved the major issues of the initial effort.
This plan passed federal scrutiny but progress was slow. Like Roanoke,
Charlotte disguised its stasis by celebrating token desegregation even while
flouting many of the laws which would increase integration.79 The African
American community became impatient with the sluggish change.
While Roanoke’s schools slowly achieved token desegregation, the city’s
confrontation over public accommodations and civil rights reached its zenith. The
black community hoped that the city might close a major open garbage dump
located in the heart of its community. This issue had been around for years and
was a serious blight in their neighborhoods. Only after community organizations
threatened to hold “Birmingham-style demonstrations” and mass meetings did
the city take action. Where such events threatened to harm its reputation and
77 Roanoke City School Board Minutes, February 25, 1963, 5.
78 Roanoke City School Board Minutes, June 27, 1963, pg. 1.
79 Douglas, Reading, Writing, Race, 75-76.

33

damage its business-friendly image, white Roanoke acted on the demands of the
NAACP.

The Non-Violent Movement Comes to Roanoke
Roanoke’s most vocal civil rights controversy involved the operation of an
open dump. The Washington Park dump was located squarely in the black
Northwest section of Roanoke. The historic neighborhood of Gainesboro,
because of an older settlement by the same name at the location, was the heart
of the African American community in Roanoke. The city used rock from a quarry
nearby for construction purposes as the economy exploded in the nineteenth and
early twentieth century. The dump had long been in existence and for just as
long, the African American community protested against its ugly presence. Years
later, this empty quarry proved to be a perfect place for the city to dump trash.
Black residents remember the dumping at least as early as the 1920s. In
September of 1953, the Roanoke Tribune, a weekly African American newspaper
reported on citizens who, “having become exhausted after years of wishful
waiting, have united to obtain absolute discontinuance of an open dump which
the City is operating right in the midst of a thickly populated section of the city.”80
Unfortunately, the City Council would not “agree without delay to discontinue this
open dump and thereby remove that terrible blot from our ‘All-American City”’ as

80“ Irate Citizens Unite to Fight Health Hazard”, Roanoke Tribune, Septem ber 26, 1953.
Unfortunately most extant copies of the Roanoke Tribune were destroyed in a fire at the
newspaper. Most of the remaining run can be found at the State Library of Virginia in
Richmond.
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the Tribune’s editor, F.E. Alexander hoped.81 Frank W. Claytor spoke on behalf of
the African American community, saying that no improvements had been made
for the previous two years despite promises of reform. The Council countered
that the dump was still two years away from being filled, when it could become a
park for the Gainesboro neighborhood. Despite a report by Virginia’s Health
Commission urging closure, the Council unanimously adopted a motion to study
the health effects of the dump and look into costs of a new incinerator or
landfill.82 In other words, delay. The dump would not be closed in the promised
two years and it became a wound to Roanoke’s African American community that
continued to fester.
The dump was within smelling distance of Lucy Addison High School,
Burrell Memorial Hospital, the Lincoln Terrace Housing Projects, First Street
Baptist Church, Hill Street Baptist Church, and several other institutions of the
black community. The metric of smelling distance is germane because the
residents could smell it well. According to Reverend Edward Burton, it was “an
open dump... I emphasize the term dump, now, and I’m saying dump and not
landfill... in the landfill, of course, they continue to cover it over and in this open
city dump they did not cover it over.”83 Juanita Taylor remembers “big rats and
things were running all over Orange Avenue, all over Lincoln Terrace, all over

81 F. E. Alexander, “ Editorial: Virginia Health Bulletin Condemns Open City Dump”, Roanoke
Tribune, Septem ber 26, 1953.
82 Roanoke City Council Minutes, September 28, 1953, pg 450.
83 Rev. Edward T. Burton, Interview with Michael A. Cooke, June 3, 1992, Oral History Collection,
Harrison Museum of African American Culture, Roanoke, Virginia. 7.
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everywhere. Great big rats. Not mice, rats.”84 In the summer of 1962, a dead
horse was thrown into the dump. Reverend Burton saw this throwing of the horse
“in the dump and I sort of think that ...just...blew the lid off.”85
In early 1963, it was announced that the city would close the dump by
June 1. A few months later, city manager Arthur Owens announced that this date
was impossible to meet because of repairs needed to an incinerator that was to
replace the dump. The new closing date was scheduled for February of 1964,
outraging an African American community tired of delay. In May, members of the
NAACP and Reverend Wilkinson attended a City Council meeting and
threatened demonstrations. Wilkinson told the City Council “we are willing to walk
[and] to demonstrate.”86 He also criticized the delaying of the Council by asking
“How long do you want us to have to wait? My people are tired o f ... of this old,
ugly subject.”87 The phrase “Birmingham-style demonstrations” swept through the
white and black communities in Roanoke. The actual demonstrations planned by
the NAACP involved mothers living in Gainesboro. They ‘were going to come
down... to march around Washington Park dump and say, “Look ya’II this is not
healthy.’”88 The gendered protest fit the “respectable and civilized” mold that most
politics in Roanoke followed. By using mothers and baby carriages, the Roanoke

84 Juanita Taylor, Interview with George Heller, May 27, 1992, Oral History Collection, Harrison
Museum of African American Culture, Roanoke, Virginia, 3-4.
85 Burton, 8.
^ “Demonstrations Feared Unless Park Dump Closed”, Roanoke Times, May 14, 1963.
^ “Demonstrations F eared...” Roanoke Times, May 14, 1963.
88 “ Fred,” white male school teacher, 7.
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NAACP sent a message parallel to other non-violent protests that emphasized
the humanity of marginalized African Americans. The demonstration had been
extensively planned out. Even with such an emotional issue that had plagued the
community for decades, NAACP leaders prepared the participants to remain
disciplined and “civilized.” It was also notable that the protest was entirely female
driven. The NAACP leadership and members of City Council were all male. With
the female protesters, the African American leaders distanced themselves from
those actually protesting. The gendered protest fit within Roanoke’s politics of
respectability. Male African American leaders avoided participation in the civil
disobedience.
A leader who broke Roanoke's code of “respectable” protest was
Reverend James Allison, a white minister for the Raleigh Court Presbyterian
Church. Allison called the dump “immoral” and threatened that “this is the kind of
thing from which social riots are made. I submit that this is a danger.”89
Surprisingly, Allison’s comments drew more criticism from local leaders and
citizens, than Wilkinson’s. Allison became one of the primary spokespersons for
the movement to close the dump. He declared it evidence of a “monumental
indifference in the well-being of black people” in Roanoke.90 The white
newspapers, the Roanoke Times and Roanoke World-News, both printed
editorials critical of the ministers, but the World-News went farther, in arguing that
the dump was not a racial issue. The editorial board felt that

89 Reverend James A. Allison, interview with Lillian Howard Potter, January 10, 1996, Lewis-Gale
Hospital, Salem, Virginia. As quoted in Potter, “We W ent About It Peacefully”, 61.
90 Interview with Reverend Jam es Allison.
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It [was] highly unfortunate... that two ministers, one white and one
Negro, should raise the specter of racial demonstrations and even
of riots over the city’s inability to close the open dump in
Washington Park... Their words could have the effect of stimulating
just such trouble as Birmingham has been witnessing.91
The editorial also argued that
Negro Citizens of the community, particularly those who reside near
the dump, would have the most to lose by any sort of mass
demonstrations. These inevitably would raise tensions and set back
the Negro’s drive for equality under the law and social progress... A
bit more temperance of expression and considerable amount of
restraint are what is needed.
The white community knew the dump was a serious problem, but the
threat of demonstrations or violence deflated any will to solve this
problem. White Roanokers reserved their strongest anger for Allison as a
white minister who acknowledged the black demands and favored
supporting them. In the overall scheme of maintaining white political
power, Allison’s vocal response was ultimately dangerous to the status
quo. Similar anger was reserved for the Episcopal Bishop William
Marmion, another liberal clergyman who supported desegregation.92
Additionally, 1963 had been a major year for the Civil Rights movement in
Birmingham, and the images of Bull Connor with his attack dogs and water hoses
were vivid in the minds of Roanokers who had seen this broadcast over the
evening news only months before. Likewise, nearby Danville, Virginia had
received some of the largest and most violent civil rights demonstrations in

91 “Intemperate Language And Racial Tension Cannot Solve Dump Problem ”, Roanoke WorldNews, May 15, 1963.
92 Marmion had long fought internally within the Episcopal diocese to desegregate the Church’s
summer bible camp.
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Virginia. Martin Luther King had made a well publicized appearance, something
Roanoke’s white leaders dreaded. Years later, Wilkinson commented that “when
the thing got hot in Danville... we got closer together... under the administration
of former [Roanoke] Mayor Stoller.”93 Wilkinson partially credited this
communication with achieving NAACP goals without as many demonstrations.
With protests that crossed gender and racial lines and openly confronted
the city’s power, along with a tense national environment, the city’s white
leadership knew it had to create a quick solution. Roanoke’s most powerful men
responded to the potential racial problems by reviving the old biracial committee
that had not met since school desegregation in 1960. The committee declared it
imperative to close the dump by June 1, 1963 if race relations were to be kept
harmonious. The group drew up several plans and finally decided that the best
one would create a landfill in the predominantly white, but sparsely populated
East Gate neighborhood. Three of the group’s members pitched this idea to the
mayor. The entire committee did not go because “two or three [members] who
[they] felt could do the best job” would be less intimidating to those in charge.94
The mayor agreed with the plan and put it to the City Council soon after. The City
Council reluctantly agreed to close the dump by a vote of 4-2 in a meeting behind
closed doors.95

“NAACP Praises Fairness,” Washington Post, October 31, 1965.
94 Lawrence Hamlar, Interview with Lillian Potter Howard, January 5, 1996, Roanoke, Virginia. As
quoted in Potter, “W e Did It Peacefully”, 65.
95 “Stoller Calls Council To Act On City Dump,” Roanoke World-News, May 23, 1963
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The city’s leadership and business elite often decided racial issues behind
closed doors. Following the city dump protest, Roanoke’s leaders and the biracial
committee decided that lunch counters and public areas had to be desegregated
to avoid further demonstrations. This was primarily accomplished through an
“interracial group working privately,” including, “John Hancock, the [now]
deceased Chairman of Roanoke Steel and several other prominent people.”96
The group planned for:
one white person and one black person, [which] they assigned... to
lunch counters throughout the City and drugstores... Two or three
days later the Roanoke Times and World News came out with an
editorial congratulating Roanokers for accepting integration unlike
other southern cities that had had so many problems. The idea
was that if you could tell people they did something, and it was
done they would be satisfied. And indeed it worked out very well.97
The school board continued this pattern, frequently acting out of the public eye
and taking special care in the language it used concerning actions related to
desegregation. Nearly every meeting on desegregation required the presence of
the city attorney, because any decisions made by the School Board could have
far reaching consequences in this time period.
In communities like Roanoke or Charlotte, demonstrations could
successfully force city leaders to take action because they “were acutely aware
of their national image on racial issues.”98 Greensboro, North Carolina served as
the most well-known example of such demonstrations. Both Roanoke and
Greensboro featured similar percentages of African Americans, and the white
96 Interview with “ Fred,” 7.
97 Interview with “ Fred,” 7.
98 Davison Douglas, Reading, Writing, and Race, 89.
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leadership considered itself “beacon[s] of southern progressivism” committed to
“good race relations.”99 Yet Roanoke’s “respectable” protest never reached the
level of participation of that found in Greensboro. Unlike Greensboro, activism in
Roanoke always originated with African American elites, not students.
One possible explanation for Roanoke’s unique history compared to that
of Greensboro, a similar city, is that Roanoke lacked a Historically Black College.
This provided a radical element of change in Greensboro. By launching the
student sit-in movement, Greensboro’s black community clashed directly with the
white power structure, defining more equal relations that were not based on
“civilities.” In Greensboro’s protests, the students “were the only ones who could
have begun the sit-ins.”100 While the entire African American community later
joined in the demonstrations, the students had an ability to protest because they
could “speak up loudly... without fear of economic reprisal.”101 In Roanoke, no
student element radicalized the black community, which eventually felt the effects
of such “smooth” relations. This is not to say that high school students did not
attempt to fill this role. In some communities, like Chicago, high school students
were intimately aware of the substandard conditions in predominantly African
American schools. These students, inspired by the non-violent and direct action
movements of the period, used sit-ins, walkouts, and boycotts to protest school

"W illia m H. Chafe, Civilities and Civil Rights: Greensboro, North Carolina, and the Black
Struggle for Freedom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 6-10.
100 Chafe, Civilities and Civil Rights, 94.
101 Chafe, Civilities and Civil Rights, 94.
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policies and conditions.102 A teacher at Lucy Addison High School explains why
similar actions did not occur in Roanoke:
What happened was there was a fellow in town who patterned
himself as a Black Panther. He dressed in the black leather jacket,
the black clothes, the beret, the bandana and he carried a
briefcase. I think he came several times to have a conference with
the black Principal, man to man... He invited this young man in
with his outfit and this attache case...Well again, this is all hearsay
after the fact, but supposedly Mr. Day said, “What is on your mind?”
And he started going through this litany of black power philosophy
at the time... [Mr. Day] got up from his desk, he took off his coat,
put it on the back of a chair and said, “Son, let me tell you
something. I have worked all my life for this day. If you and any of
your actions screw it up then you will answer to me.” After he took
off his coat he rolled up his sleeves, and in effect confronted what
he considered to be a potential with counter potential, and that is
the last we heard of the black militant coming on campus for any
reason.
103

Roanoke’s conservative middle class would not allow protest or any Black
Nationalist politics, particularly in schools. In communities like Greensboro,
students mostly avoided college administrators who tried to snuff out dissent by
threatening expulsion to students who attempted to get arrested protesting.104
The absence of significant activism from students became a defining feature of
Roanoke’s response to the civil rights movement. This would influence city
leader’s actions during the next phase of integration and indeed, “civility” also
defined busing in Roanoke.

102 Dionne Danns, “Chicago High School Students’ Movement For Quality Public Education,
1966-1971,” Journal o f African American History Vo\. 88:2 (Spring, 2003), 138-150.
103 “ Fred,” 10-11. The teacher’s derisive tone regarding Black Nationalist style and politics
reinforce the status such students held in Roanoke.
104 Chafe, Civilities and Civil Rights, 130-135.
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Roanoke For Busing?
On March 9, 1965, Reverend Raymond Wilkinson chastised the school
board for failing to erect a new Junior High School in Northwest Roanoke.105
Booker T. Washington Junior High had long been the only black Junior High in
the city and it was extremely overcrowded. In 1962, the enrollment for Booker T.
Washington was at 684 although it was only built to hold 500. The overcrowded
conditions were supposed to have been alleviated by the bond issue of 1958, but
the black community was, according to Rev. Wilkinson, “put up on a scaffold of
promise in 1958 that cost $600,000. [The School Board] broke the scaffold and
[the black community] fell in a valley of need and want surrounded by broken
promises.”106 Despite the abstract analogies, the black community was serious
about its demands. The school board pointed out that the land for a new junior
high was in conflict with a spur of Interstate 581, so construction was delayed
until this was resolved.107 Although this was a legitimate excuse, the school
board had more trouble explaining the many under capacity white schools and
the overcrowded black schools.
In 1966-67, Roanoke finished desegregating its schools according to
school board plans. Despite the completion of their plan, the “fully integrated area
105l_ynn Hancock. “’Our W ay to Freedomsville’: Raymond R. W ilkinson and Roanoke’s Civil Rights
Movement. Prepared for the W estern Virginia Historical Society. Nov. 29, 1994. As quoted by
Roanoke Resident, Reverend Ivory Morton.
106Letter to the Roanoke City School Board from Rev. Raymond W ilkinson, March 9, 1965.
107Roanoke County School Board Minutes, March 9, 1965, 1-2. The 1-581 issue has more far
reaching problems for the Roanoke African American community. The city constructed the
Orange Avenue on-ram p over an African American cemetery, necessitating movement of the
several graves. The project also forced the relocation of several houses in this primarily African
American neighborhood, causing the subsequent closing of many small businesses and
economic depression in the area.
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schools” did not appear as successfully integrated as proposed.108 During the
1967-68 school year, of the four high schools in the area, desegregation had
occurred at William Fleming and Jefferson (15% and 10% African American
respectively), but Patrick Henry remained all white and Lucy Addison all black.
The junior high schools reflected similar numbers with several schools
maintaining segregation or having token integration (Breckinridge Junior High
had 3 black students in a total population of 926). Even formerly integrated
schools like Melrose Elementary became re-segregated due to changing housing
patterns and white flight. Faculties were somewhat desegregated but on an even
more modest scale than that of students.109 The primary cause of the continued
segregation was extensive housing segregation. As long as Roanoke’s black and
white communities remained separated, the school board had no way to
integrate schools without requiring transportation. Of course, school jurisdiction
lines had not been drawn to promote integration, but even an earnest effort
would not have created schools with a racial balance proportional to Roanoke’s
population.
By 1969 the situation had not improved with only one white student in the
otherwise all black Lucy Addison High School. Patrick Henry High School
remained all-white. The junior high and elementary schools also made little
improvement. The black community became impatient and filed an appeal to the

108 “Fully Integrated Area Schools Open: First Day in City Termed ‘Sm ooth’”, Roanoke WorldN ew s, Septem ber 6, 1966.
109lnterrogatories, Roanoke Office of the Superintendent, October 26, 1967. This table is
reproduced in Appendix B and contains the numbers and ethnicities enrolled in Roanoke city
schools as well as Faculty and Staff employed in each school.

44

district court seeking further racial balance in the schools. A three Judge panel
decided the case on June 17, 1970, ruling that Roanoke schools had “failed to
dismantle its dual school system and [was] not presently operating a unitary
system.”110 The court went on to say that the case of “Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Bd. Of Ed. controls this school case.”111 This decision meant that
Roanoke would need more racially balanced schools and would have to rely on
mandated busing to achieve this balance.
In 1970, busing was extremely controversial throughout the nation.
President Nixon argued against using busing to achieve desegregation and many
whites in the North and South, sided with him. Judge James B. McMillan had
decided in the Swann case that the only way to desegregate the large Charlotte
school district was through busing. Schools in the inner city would be grouped
with those in the suburbs and an equal number of people would be cross-bused
between the two.112 The “cross-busing” plan was particularly controversial
because so many students would be forced to attend schools outside their
neighborhood.
In Roanoke, the school board avoided cross-busing. A former member of
the school board explained: “We had a busing-out plan. We closed the schools in
the inner-city and bused them out. That kept down [white] resistance because

110United States Fourth Court of Appeals, Cynthia Greene V. Roanoke School Board, June 17,
1970, 2.
111 Green v. Roanoke School Board, 3.
112 Bernard Schwartz, Sw ann’s Way: The School Busing Case and the Supreme Court, (New
York; Oxford University Press, 1986) 18-19.
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there was not any cross-busing, it was one way.”113 Clear planning by the school
board minimized conflict, particularly within the white community. In 1970,
Virginia Governor Linwood Holton received over a thousand letters on busing
almost all in opposition. Most came from Richmond or Norfolk, with only four from
Roanoke, the fourth largest metropolitan area in Virginia. Of these, two were for
busing and two against.114 Busing did not become a divisive force for hate and
violence in Roanoke as it did in cities from Richmond to Boston.
The comparable lack of racial antipathy, as well as changing housing
patterns led to the first election of an African American to the City Council. Noel
C. Taylor, the minister of High Street Baptist Church since 1961, won a tight City
Council Election after dozens of other African Americans had subsequently lost,
including Roanoke Tribune editor F. E. Alexander on numerous occasions. While
Richmond held segregationist rallies attended by hundreds, South Carolina mobs
attacked the school buses and children themselves, and even supposedly liberal
Boston strenuously resisted the policy.115 Roanoke elected its first African
American to the City Council, partly because City leadership managed to limit the
number of white students who travelled to black neighborhood schools. The
precedent for avoiding any and all racial conflict helped earn political

113 “W arren,” June 15, 2005, A Black School Board member, pg 4.
114 Linwood Holton G overnor Papers 1970, Library of Virginia, Box 144, Education/Busing Folder.
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representation, but forced African American students to attend schools far from
their neighborhoods.
While these schools often provided a good education, a sense of
community was lost with the eventual closing of Booker T. Washington Junior
High and Lucy Addison’s transformation to a city administration building and a
magnet middle school. Many African Americans felt that integration was positive
and offered educational benefits, but some argued that the community itself lost
cohesiveness when the institution of the black school and especially the black
high school disappeared. According to many in the community “the true [Lucy]
Addison [High School] ended in the fall of 1970” with the integration of white
students. Even today, Addison’s high school reunions remain a segregated affair
with no white students invited to them.116According to a former white teacher at
Addison, “Blacks, you know, had decreased from it being their school to it being
just another public institution.”117 The black community that revolved around Lucy
Addison High School and its athletics, teachers, band, and students disappeared.
Another black resident felt that:
After integration, I think, blacks lost a lot of identity. I have people
that had families up on Henry Street, what we call Henry Street,
and all that just went away. You could go there and really see just
about anybody you wanted to see. Then after integration everything
just went the other way.118

116 Darlene Richardson. Interview with Author, November 17, 2007, W ashington D.C. Darlene is
one of the white students not invited to reunions.
117 Interview with “ Fred,” 12.
118 “ Hank,” Former black male parent, Interviewed by Peter Jones and Emma Burris, June 27,
2005, Roanoke, VA, 4.
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With the opening of downtown and white businesses to the black community,
many shopped where they worked, rather than where they lived. The once
dynamic black commerce in Gainesboro atrophied.
With busing, the student bodies of Roanoke’s high schools achieved racial
balances of essentially 3 to 1, the ratio of white to black residents in the city.
Students interacted in different ways with the increased integration. One area of
interaction between white and black students, extracurricular activities, brought
interesting results. Sports were one of the easiest ways to ease the tensions of
desegregation. According to one female black student, “football and basketball in
particular, really gave the two different races the ability to get to know each other
individually and as a team.”119 Black athletes could also provide a role model for
positive reactions to integration. At Lucy Addison High School, Al Holland, who
later played for the Philadelphia Phillies and lettered in several sports, helped
smooth race relations whenever fights broke out.120
In 1973, the Federal Court of Appeals considered Roanoke’s school
system desegregated enough to remand the Cynthea Green v. Roanoke School
Board case back to lower district court for monitoring. Later, the city continued to
combat white flight and changing housing patterns with more busing and
redistricting. In 1986, Frank Tota would take over control as Superintendent and
install magnet programs in several different schools. School systems nation-wide
considered this a way to achieve a more uniform racial balance with less public

119 “Mary,” 1 January 2005, fem ale black student, pg 12.
120 Darlene Richardson, Interview with Author, November 17, 2007
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resistance than busing.121 In trying to maintain a representative racial balance,
magnet schools provided one method of many available to the school board.
Unfortunately, with continued re-segregation of housing, schools also became re
segregated.
Educationally, school integration provided many changes to the school
system with far reaching effects that were both expected and unintended. One of
the most discussed is a generation of children, white and black, who learned to
interact socially together. Lucy Addison’s 1970-71 yearbook mentions the
“problems” but concludes that the students made it work. Likewise, Darlene
Richardson, a white student in the first integrated class at Addison tells what she
learned on the first day:
My Dad, like I said, had scared me to death. He’d said, “Just let one
of them lay one finger on you and ... I’ll probably be in jail” and
“they like little blond haired girls.” And he just had me scared to
death. And I remember going to home room and sitting in the desk
and there on the desk, you can tell, it’s years and years of hearts
with initials in it and I’m like, “they’re just like us.” It hit me then, I
thought, “how does Dad know, he didn’t go to school with them.” I
don’t know, it just hit me that he didn’t know what he was talking
about.122
Integrated schooling expanded her perspective on race and led to her role as a
public historian in which she has helped protect an African American cemetery
from being destroyed by urban development.
But students’ experiences did not mirror that of teachers. With the
integration of schools came major changes for white and black teachers. As early
121 Lester, Three Decades o f Delay, 35. Tota was also unpopular as an outsider who made drastic
changes to the school administration when he arrived.
122 Darlene Richardson, Interview with Author, November 17, 2007, Arlington, Virginia, 4.
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as June, 1954, a Roanoke Times editorial cautioned that African American
teachers could lose jobs as a result of integration.123 In some school districts,
African American teachers were fired wholesale as dual school systems became
unitary ones. Many teachers, including those in western Virginia preemptively left
their jobs in Virginia for positions farther north in Maryland or Pennsylvania. In
Lexington, VAthis was particularly devastating to the small African American
community in which school teachers were the backbone of the middle class.
Several African American businesses closed as a result of the teacher exodus.
Roanoke did not experience such effects to any major degree. When
asked whether any teachers were let go as a result of integration, a school board
administrator responded “no, we didn’t have enough black teachers” to make up
the 20% needed under Roanoke’s plan.124 In addition, “where there was a white
principle, [the school board] placed a black assistant principle... so the kids could
relate. If they got in trouble and went to the office, they could see somebody who
looked like them.”125
During the early 1960s, Roanoke’s faculty integration was limited.
Traditionally white faculties remained that way with integration as piecemeal as
that of students. By the mid 1960s, Federal Court rulings made it clear that
integration had to come to faculties to a greater extent and Roanoke responded
with increases in faculty transfers. The school administration scrutinized these

123 “Editorial: Caution in School Integration,” Roanoke Times, June 13, 1954.
124 Interview with “W arren,” 5.
125 Interview with “W arren,” 4.
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very thoroughly. One teacher requested a transfer to an all-black school in order
to teach a more desirable subject. He describes his interview:
‘Well [name redacted], everything sounds alright but we just wanted
to check you out to make sure you weren’t some kind of radical or
something.’ See the idea, at that time— if a white person had— I
guess, and I am not saying this is a compliment to me—but if a
white person out of the blue said in this time, ‘I want to go to an all
black school,’ they had a legitimate concern. ‘What is this guy’s
motivation to be here? Does he have an agenda or is he living in
some kind of world in which he really doesn’t know about things.’126
Though student integration remained scattered, the changes affected faculty
retention. In each year that the level of desegregation noticeably increased,
1960-61 and 1970-71, or threatened to increase, like 1955-56, the school system
saw white teachers flood out of the occupation. School board minutes list the
reasons as “transferred out of school district”, “retired early”, “left the profession”,
or “personal reasons.” Yet, the specter of teaching desegregated classrooms
loomed for many of these teachers and must be considered as an unspoken
motive.
The exodus of teachers on the eve of major school desegregation events
had unintended results on educational outcomes, both positive and negative
effects. Presumably, teachers uncomfortable enough with integration to leave
school would not treat African American and white children equally and possibly
discriminate as some interviews indicate. Sandra Smith Jordan recalls her first
year of integration:
I, myself, was put in a school that teachers point blank told me,
‘hey, we didn’t ask you niggers to come here, and I got mine. You

126 Interview with “ Fred,” 6.
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get yours the best way you can.’ My ninth grade education was
nada- nothing.127
One pioneering African American student described her experience with teachers
unsure of how to handle African American students:
The teaching systems were different. The 7 of us that went in into
Monroe, we were all gifted kids. Very good in grades, the best of
quality I guess of the students, as far as grades. However, the
teachers did not acknowledge us. We were just like we weren’t
there as far as being taught. The teachers were afraid of us. They
didn’t know how to handle us. The older teachers were mean and
hateful and rude. Teachers were bad. They didn’t want to teach us.
It was just like we weren’t wanted anyway and the students were
the same way.128
Though some students and teachers had difficult experiences relating in
the classroom, most studies concluded that desegregation led to positive
educational outcomes. With the changes in faculty and students, along with the
closing of inner city schools and the construction of new schools (as a result of
the 1958 School Bond), Roanoke’s school system underwent incredible changes.
This had major effects on an urban community that itself had been undergoing
intense structural change.

The “Renewal” of a Community
Along with the opening and closing of certain neighborhood schools,
Roanoke’s black northeast and northwest neighborhoods underwent extensive
physical changes between 1950 and the 1970s. The process began in Roanoke,

127 Sandra Smith Jordan, Interview with George R. Heller, May 30, 1992, Oral History Collection,
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along with cities across America, following the Housing Acts of 1949 and 1954.
The new acts offered significant federal funding and an expanded definition of
eminent domain to clear “blighted” areas in the inner city. The first housing
developments in Roanoke were the white Lansdowne Park and the black Lincoln
Terrace, built in 1952. The first slum clearance projects, as the city council
described them, targeted black neighborhoods in Northeast Roanoke in 1955.129
The Commonwealth project resulted in most of Northeast’s housing replaced by
the Roanoke Civic Center and other private businesses.130
In 1964, a second program of urban renewal cleared much of the
remaining housing in Roanoke’s northeast. The Kimball Project made many of
the same mistakes made by the Commonwealth Project. Though both built public
housing for the displaced residents, it was not big enough and the rent too
expensive for many former residents. Following the Kimball Project, Roanoke
planned a major project for Gainsboro in 1968. This project was different from the
earlier developments because it attacked the neighborhood in a piecemeal
fashion. Several roads were closed or diverted to make room for easements and
changes in traffic patterns related to the growth. The “history of promoting the
‘clearance and removal’ philosophy of... urban renewal” caused the closing of
such community icons as the Hotel Dumas, The Ebony Club, Lincoln Theater,
and Palace Hotel.131 Because of the school board’s “busing out” plan, numerous

129 Mary Bishop, “Street by Street, Block by Block: How Urban Renewal Uprooted Black
Roanoke,” Roanoke Times and W orld-News, January 29, 1995, 2.
130 Please see detailed map of urban renewal in Appendix C.
131

Claytor, Black Com m unity Observations, 3-5. see also, Mary Campagna-Hamlin, Gainesboro:
The Destruction o f a Historic Community. (Roanoke, VA: self-published, 1995), 5-7.
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neighborhood schools were closed including Lucy Addison High School. The
effect on the historic neighborhood was disastrous. With the closure of these
icons, came the loss of more than just buildings, but a sense of community.
Henry Street became a shell of its former self with the closing of nearly fifty
businesses, law offices, doctors’ and dentists’ offices, churches, and theatres.
Concurrent with Urban Renewal, a second feature arrived on the urban
landscape: the raised highway. In 1966, the city completed a major raised
highway running from Interstate 81 through the city. City planners routed
Interstate 581 between the historic, black community of Gainesboro and the
Commonwealth project. Indeed, one argument for the renewal projects had been
that the dilapidated housing did not provide “a very prestigious entrance to the
city” according to Mary Picket, a Roanoke city councilwoman in the 1950s.132
Despite the neighborhood’s appearance, Zenobia Ferguson told Mindy
Thompson Fullilove that “we felt like we owned something. But then when the
community was taken away, and we had to move away from it, it was just sad. It
took that feeling of pride away from us.”133
While Roanoke’s urban renewal policy had negative outcomes for many
involved and the community as a whole, it must not be examined only in
hindsight. The Roanoke City Council came to the project with good intentions
and thought renewal would bring improvements to all residents, including those

132 Bishop, “Street by Street”, Roanoke Times & World-News, 2. Picket is quoted in an interview
for the 1995 article.
133

Mindy Thompson Fullilove, Root Shock: How Tearing Up City Neighborhoods Hurt America
and What We Can Do A bout It, (New York: Ballentine Books, 2004), 88.
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whose houses would be cleared. This was not the case in Norfolk’s where Mayor
Fred Duckworth initiated a more sinister brand of clearance between 1956 and
1958.134 Norfolk’s business oriented civic leadership had participated in
legitimate early urban planning efforts in the early fifties. With the rise of Massive
Resistance, however, Duckworth led urban planning in alarming directions. A
process began where communities that pushed for desegregation suddenly
became listed for redevelopment and in a matter of months dozens of acres of
houses would be razed under the Housing Act of 1949. Most of the projects had
little to no rationale for clearance except the color of the residents’ skin.135 In the
Atlantic City neighborhood, middle class African Americans had begun moving
into the mostly single-family dwellings. This neighborhood initially had good
enough housing that the Norfolk health department targeted it for code
enforcement meaning that property values would increase from improvements
made to existing structures. Poor neighborhood (“slums”) property values would
be better served through demolition and affluent neighborhoods wouldn’t have
enough code violations to significantly depress property values. Furthermore, the
area was the only district that was predominantly white but with 10% black
residents.136 Thirteen of the students in the NAACP’s school integration suit of
1956 lived in Atlantic City. Redevelopment of the neighborhood was announced
between the process of discovery and the Judge’s order to integrate the school.

134 Forrest R. W hite, Pride and Prejudice: School Desegregation and Urban Renewal in Norfolk,
1950-1959, (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1992), xv.
135 White, Pride and Prejudice, 103-115.
136 White, Pride and Prejudice, 122-135.
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Between the announcement of redevelopment and initial demolition, only nine
months passed. By the 1957-58 school year, the threat to integration had been
averted through demolition diplomacy.137
The contrast here to Roanoke is stark. The attitude within the African
American community was not monolithic. A. L. Holland described this: “see you
got your two Ps, preservation and progress. I got a 1997 Ford Ranger, but I
couldn’t expect to get the price for that like a 2004. So some things you got to let
go.”138 One anonymous Gainsboro resident said that Henry Street (Gainsboro’s
primary commercial district) had been “glamorized and romanticized. Henry
Street was a street of hustlers. Just realize... life was nice, but life was hard.”139
Roanoke’s process of urban renewal did not aim to cause problems for its
displaced residents. Efforts were made to create new housing, pay a “fair price”,
and use land constructively. Neighborhoods were chosen with urban policy,
though politics was inevitably a part. Yet the forces of urban renewal and school
closings created major pains for the community’s identity. With the closing of its
largest landmarks came more than just the loss of bricks and mortar.
Unfortunately, these forces occurred simultaneously with problems for the
greater city economy. The Norfolk Southern Railroad ended passenger service to
Roanoke in the 1970s; in the 1980s it transferred its headquarters from Roanoke
to Norfolk, along with thousands of jobs.140 Roanoke responded to these

137 White, Pride and Prejudice, 138-140.
138 Alphonso Holland, Sr. Interview with author. November 30, 2007, Roanoke, VA, 8.
139 Bishop, “Street by Street”, Roanoke Times and World-News, 6.
140 Dotson, Magic City o f the New South, 241.
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changes in similar ways to rust belt cities by attempting to increase tourism and
the technology industry, but the economy did not return to previous levels. African
Americans were often the first fired when jobs were cut, showing the disparities
that still existed between the two communities despite rhetoric to the contrary.141

Integrating the ‘Star City’
The integration of Roanoke was much more complex than assumed by
previous scholars. While there were no school closings to evade desegregation
and widespread violence did not occur, resistance to desegregation was just as
strong as that in the eastern portion of Virginia. Even in a city that prided itself on
“smooth” racial relations, the intervention of Roanoke Steel’s John Hancock as
part of the “secret biracial committee” suggests that reforms would come at a
speed appropriate to those in power. A style of inside and backchannel
leadership within Roanoke thwarted African American resistance to urban
renewal.
With integration, many doors opened educationally for African Americans.
It is also important to remember the decades of delay and sheer difficulty of
achieving any semblance of desegregation. While achieving civil rights with
minimal conflict was a positive characteristic of Roanoke’s style, in the end, it
proved to be a double-edged sword, cutting the black community off at its roots.

141 Thom as Sugrue, The Origins o f the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit.
(Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996).
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The image of Prince Edward County’s Massive Resistance will always
remain the symbol for Virginia’s Civil Rights Movement. It is an event that deals
directly with what Eric Foner called “American Irony.” A female black high school
student, leading her classmates in a strike against oppressive authorities made a
great story. Political pressures from below pushed NAACP lawyers farther than
they wanted to go in the name of freedom. These are ideals enumerated in
America’s founding documents. Prince Edward County also provides examples of
how America has never completely lived up to its ideals. A generation of African
Americans never graduated from high school in Prince Edward County. Violence
and hate served to remind African Americans who ran that county, as the schools
were closed from 1959 to 1964. Ultimately, that morality play gained a happy
ending when fully integrated schools were opened there in 1964. The era of
Massive Resistance was a powerful time, but scholars need to remember that
another type of resistance occurred.
The stories of those who lived through events in Roanoke challenged the
Prince Edward County model of desegregation in Virginia. In Roanoke, massive
resistance never became an official policy. Yet “smooth” relations did not bring
meaningful integration. Leaders of the African American middle class agreed to
minimize open conflict in return for a voice in some city decisions. African
Americans consistently held appointed positions on the Roanoke School Board
and Noel C. Taylor was even elected mayor from 1975 to 1992. Despite African
American representation on the school board, it did not move towards
desegregation unless forced to do so by judicial mandate.
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In Roanoke, passive resistance kept schools essentially (or completely)
segregated much longer than massive resistance. Urban renewal brought
positive changes for Roanoke’s downtown, but at the expense of a black
community who lost not only bricks and mortar but pieces of their identity and
history. These are some of the ironies of Roanoke’s Civil Rights Movement. The
democratic movements, for which the Civil Rights Movement is famous, only
touched Roanoke briefly. Replacing these were a secret biracial committee that
successfully integrated many businesses, golf courses, parks, waiting rooms,
and buses. The School Board resisted change for over a decade and then closed
inner city schools that whites largely did not want to attend. This smoothing over
of racial conflicts and reliance on civilized discussion even in the face of
discrimination created an environment where it was possible for an African
American to be elected mayor in a City which was overwhelmingly white.
Roanoke acted like other southern “moderate” cities, but unlike Greensboro, it
didn’t feature a large activist student population. Though Roanoke bused
thousands of students, it never bused white students to black schools in as large
of numbers as Charlotte did in the early 1970s. This created an environment in
Roanoke that differed greatly from Greensboro, Charlotte, and especially Prince
Edward County.
For historians of the Civil Rights Movement, it can be tempting to focus
only on the most scandalous or well-known events. But it can be dangerous to
make a symbol stand for an entire state. Roanoke shows that discrimination in
the context of school desegregation cannot be calculated by the number of

59

schools closed. Likewise, the 1960s did not inspire popular resistance
movements in every urban area. Yet even without shuttered schools or a forceful
protest movement, Roanoke changed dramatically. Policies like the Great Society
and urban renewal interacted with desegregation in complex ways; bulldozing
made desegregation somewhat simpler. Finally, we must remember that passive
resistance kept schools largely segregated much longer than massive resistance.
Though Roanoke City leaders would prefer to hide this fact, scholars must not.

60

Apendix A

V IR G IN IA
0

□

M IL E S

50

o to 30 per cent
30 to 50 per cent
50 to 83 per cent

Map 1.

N e g r o P o p u l a t i o n P e r c e n t a g e s i n V i r g i n i a , i9 6 0

Source: Ely, Crisis of Conservative Virginia, 35.

61

Appendix B

School

Students and Teachers in Roanoke City Schools, 1967-68
African
Total
African
White
American
Students White
American

Addison High
William Fleming High
Patrick Henry High
Jefferson High
Breckinridge Jr.
Jackson Jr.
Lee Jr.
Monroe Jr.
B.T. Washington Jr.
W oodrow W ilson Jr.
Belmont Elementary
Crystal Spring Elementary
Fairview Elementary
Fishburn Park Elementary
Forest Park Elementary
Garden City Elementary
Gilmer Elementary
Grandin Court Elementary
Harrison Elementary
Highland Park Elementary
Huff Lane Elementary
Hurt Park
Jamison Elementary
Lincoln Terrace
Elementary
Loudon Elementary
Melrose Elementary
Monterey Elementary
Morningside Elementary
Oakland Elementary
Preston Park Elementary
Raleigh Court Elementary
Round Hill Elementary
Tinker Elementary
Virginia Heights
Elementary
Wasena Elementary
Washington Heights
Elementary
W est End Elementary
W estside Elementary

Totals

0

155
303
504
0
0
0
0
0
176
0
193
0
448
7
0
212
0

806
1440
1387
1035
926
732
594
842
504
722
433
435
427
208
698
279
195
208
448
469
363
212
587

6.5
70.4
68
56.6
47.8
38.6
34.6
44.4
1
37.9
20.7
17.8
17.6
10.8
23.9
12.7
0.3
9.7
0.5
23.2
17
0.7
26.6

44.3
3
0
2
0
0
3
3.2
34.1
0
0
0
0.2
0
4.4
0
9.9
0
21.1
0
0
9.5
0

50.8
73.4
68
58.6
47.8
38.6
37.6
47.6
35.1
37.9
20.7
17.8
17.8
10.8
28.3
12.7
10.2
9.7
21.6
23.2
17
10.2
26.6

0
0
35
236
353
432
385
308
375
119

377
517
597
0
0
0
0
0
10
0

377
517
632
236
353
432
385
308
385
119

0.8
0.9
14.2
10.5
15.7
18
16.9
12.7
16.9
6.9

16.5
21.6
12.5
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

17.3
22.5
26.7
10.5
15.7
18
16.9
12.7
16.9
6.9

530
351

0
0

530
351

23.6
14.9

0
0

23.6
14.9

176
284
208

0
101
0

176
385
208

8.8
16.8
9.4

0.1
2.5
0.1

8.9
19.3
9.5

14618

4726

19344

774.3

188

962.3

1 ?3D
1387
928
923
732
439
539
0
722
433
435
427
208
522
279
2
208
0
462
363
0
587

806
210
0
107
3

Total
Teachers
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Student Enrollment in Roanoke City Schools, 1970-71
Black Percentage White Percentage

School

269
1036
991
768

49.9
76.7
87.1
83.5

539
1351
1138
920

884

22.4

3064

77.6

3948

180
183
204
166
269
181

23.4
19.6
23
26.4
42.8
21.7

588
750
683
462
359
653

76.6
80.4
77
73.6
57.2
78.3

768
933
887
628
620
834

1183

25.3

3495

73.85

4670

67
0
0
0
277
0
0
465
186
68
258
6
398
559
0
0
17
75
1
78
0
0

13.6
0
0
0
42.5
0
0
100
32.5
16.3
76.3
0.9
100
96.5
0
0
3.5
18.1
0.4
19.7
0
0

425
468
436
135
374
318
225
0
387
349
80
653
0
20
428
398
468
339
270
318
610
326

86.4
100
100
100
57.5
100
100
0
67.5
83.7
23.7
99.1
0
3.5
100
100
96.5
81.9
99.6
80.3
100
100

492
468
436
135
651
318
225
465
573
417
338
659
398
orme
428
398
485
414
271
396
610
326

78
158
185

41.9
35.8
41.8

oppo5
283
258

58.1
64.2
58.2

186
441
443

2876
4943

25.592
25.8

7676
14235

74.408
74.2

10552
19178

270
315
147
152

Total High School
Breckinridge Jr.
Jackson Jr.
Madison Jr.
Monroe Jr.
Ruffner Jr.
W oodrow W ilson Jr.

Total Junior High
Belmont Elementary
Crystal Spring Elementary
Fairview Elementary
Fishburn Park Elementary
Forest Park Elementary
Garden City Elementary
Grandin Court Elementary
Harrison Elementary
Highland Park Elementary
Huff Lane Elementary
Hurt Park Elementary
Jamison Elementary
Lincoln Terrace Elementary
Melrose Elementary
Monterey Elementary
Morningside Elementary
Oakland Elementary
Preston Park Elementary
Raleigh Court Elementary
Round Hill Elementary
Virginia Heights Elementary
W asena Elementary
W ashington Heights
Elementary
W est End Elementary
W estside Elementary

Totals
Grand Total

Source:

Total

50.1
23.3
12.9
16.5

Addison High
William Fleming High
Patrick Henry High
Jefferson High

Interrogatories, Roanoke Office of the Superintendent, October 26, 1967, September

17, 1970.
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Appendix C
Roanoke Times A World Nows. Sunday. Jar 29. 1995
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